In consequence of strong changes in general economic conditions, adjustments in the agricultural sector can be expected. To date, however, there are only few policy impact analyses on agricultural investments in a dynamic-stochastic context. The objective of this paper is to develop a real options market model which allows the impact assessment of different political schemes. The model combines genetic algorithms and stochastic simulation. Simulations of the model show that investment subsidies and production ceilings are preferable to price floors because the welfare is less reduced for a given stimulation of the willingness to invest.
Introduction
The agricultural sector is currently globally exposed to strong changes in its economic environment. Examples of this are the abolishment of the milk and sugar beet quotas in the EU, the shift from price support systems to different forms of direct subsidies in many developed countries as well as the implementation of guaranteed feed-in prices for renewable energies, e.g. in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). In addition, and, at least partially, as a consequence of these previously mentioned changes, there have been extreme price fluctuations in the respective agricultural markets, e.g. in the dairy sector between 2007 and 2009. For this reason, farmers and lobbyists have recently called on their governmental organisations to provide additional market regulation (cf. e.g. European Milk Board, 2009; National Milk Producers Federation, 2009) .
In consequence of both the changes in general economic conditions and the increasing price volatility, adjustments in the agricultural sector can be expected, which usually go hand in hand with investment and disinvestment decisions. In the recent literature, there is a range of studies analysing investments in agriculture under simultaneous consideration of political schemes and uncertainty. But although prices in these models are stochastic, price expectations of the firms are mostly assumed to be static. That is why the intertemporal impact of price risk is not taken into account (cf. e.g. Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Moro, 2006, 2009; Serra et al., 2009) . Hence, the policy impact analysis on agricultural investments in a dynamicstochastic context requires more emphasis.
During the past one and a half decades, agricultural economists started to realise that the real options approach (ROA) is more advantageous for analysing investments in agriculture than traditional investment models based on the net present value (NPV) rule. The reason is that investments in agriculture are mostly afflicted by sunk costs, uncertainty of the future cash flows and temporal flexibility in making the investment. The ROA explicitly takes into account these characteristics through analysing investment decisions under dynamic-stochastic conditions and extending the NPV by the value of entrepreneurial flexibility. There already have been many empirical applications of the ROA to agricultural investment decisions (cf. e.g. Purvis et al., 1995; Richards and Patterson, 1998; Pietola and Wang, 2000; Carey and Zilberman, 2002; Odening, Mußhoff and Balmann, 2005; Hill, 2010) .
All of the aforementioned real options applications explicitly or implicitly exploit the finding of Leahy (1993) , who states that an investor in a competitive market can act totally myopic and ignore other firms' investment decisions. The underlying reason for assuming myopic planning is that it enables a straightforward analytical determination of the optimal investment strategies of the firms. However, it is applicable only if very restrictive and, at least partially, unrealistic conditions are fulfilled. For example, it implicitly excludes any political schemes which affect the price dynamics directly or indirectly. Dixit and Pindyck (1994: ch. 9 ) relax this constraint by calculating numerically the effects of politically induced price controls on the investment thresholds of the firms by means of stochastic simulation. However, their model addresses just one out of many other relevant policies and is merely limited to one standard stochastic demand process. The same restrictions apply to the model of Price, Lamb and Wetzstein (2005) . To the authors' knowledge, there has not been any real options model that can be applied sufficiently flexible and, at the same time, allows for a detailed impact analysis of different policy measures as needed.
Against the background of these methodological challenges, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it develops a real options market model which is capable of replicating numerically Leahy's optimality principle of myopic planning. It is therefore validated for its application to competitive markets underlying real options effects. Second, by means of the model, it provides the conceptual basis for policy makers to assess the impact of different political schemes on farm investment thresholds, farm profitabilities and the sectoral welfare. The model is linked with a combination of genetic algorithms (GAs), which are a heuristic optimisation technique, and stochastic simulation. Through this, the preconditions of Leahy's theorem can be relaxed and different policies can be handled. This comprises explicitly such policies which, according to Leahy, cannot be analysed analytically. For demonstration, a comparative analysis of the effects of price floors maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply, subsidies on investments and production ceilings is carried out. These measures cover relevant policies, e.g. guaranteed feed-in prices for renewable energies or the extension of production ceilings through the abolishment of quota systems, in a simplified way.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 first explains the fundamentals of the ROA. Afterwards, the real options market model is designed (Section 3). Section 4 is split into three parts: First, the model is validated for the base scenario, that is, no political scheme. Second, the model's results for the implementation and the abandonment of political schemes in general are discussed. Third, the effects of price floors, investment subsidies and production ceilings are compared. The paper ends with conclusions concerning the usefulness of political interventions in competitive markets and an evaluation of the model's application potential (Section 5).
Theoretical background
Real options models exploit the analogy between a financial option and an investment or disinvestment project (cf. e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Abel and Eberly, 1994; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) .
1 With an opportunity to invest (disinvest), a firm is holding an 'option' analogue to a financial call (put) option; it has the right but not the obligation to buy (sell) an asset at any time in the future. Without loss of generality, the following explanations just focus on investment decisions. If the firm invests, it exercises the option by giving up the opportunity of waiting for new information to arrive with a potential positive effect on the profitability of the investment. This lost continuation value of the option is an opportunity cost that should be included as part of the investment costs. Furthermore, it is highly sensitive to the uncertainty of the future cash flows. In conclusion, an irreversible investment under uncertainty should be made only if the present value of its expected returns exceeds the investment costs by an amount equal to the value of waiting for additional information. In comparison with the NPV rule, this means that the critical price at which the firm should invest, referred to as trigger price in the following, is shifted upwards because the cash flows have to compensate not only the investment costs but also the lost value from deferring the investment.
The direct transferability of the financial option pricing theory to real investment problems, however, is problematic. Financial options constitute exclusive rights for their owners, whereas real investment opportunities are also open to other market participants in competitive markets. Thus, exceeding the trigger price will also cause similar reactions of competitors, which, taken as a whole, will change sectoral supply and, with this, equilibrium prices. In consequence, the price process can no longer be considered exogenous. As the price process determines again the value of the investment and the trigger price, the direct determination of these values is considerably complicated. Leahy (1993) , however, demonstrates that under perfect competition, an investor who decides myopically and ignores potential market entries of competitors finds the same trigger price as a competitive investor.
According to Leahy's model, a perfectly competitive industry is considered, which consists of small homogeneous price-taking firms producing with the same constant returns to scale technology. The production output of all firms at time t, which equals the market supply X t , is subject to depreciation with rate l and investments of the firms in additional production capacity. The product price P t results from the reactions of all firms on the exogenous stochastic demand parameter m t . The relationship between the product price, on the one hand, and the demand and market supply, on the other hand, is defined by a time-invariant inverse demand function D, which, in the following, is assumed to be isoelastic (cf. Dixit, 1991) :
where h denotes the price elasticity of demand. The demand shock is described by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) 2 :
where a denotes the drift rate and s the volatility, whereby both parameters are constant; dz stands for the increment of a Wiener process. Given the above definitions, the stochastic demand process according to equation (2) can be translated into the stochastic price process (cf. Odening et al., 2007) :
Equation (3) describes the regulated endogenous stochastic price process, based upon which a competitive investor makes his investment decisions. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) captures price changes induced by market entries of competitors. As all firms behave in the same way, the price process will be truncated as soon as the product price climbs up to a specific trigger price level. The trigger price hence constitutes an upper reflecting barrier (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 254) . A myopic investor, however, ignores this effect and assumes an unregulated exogenous stochastic price process for his investments: Figure 1 illustrates the respective difference between the regulated endogenous price process (cf. equation (3)) and the unregulated exogenous price process (cf. equation (4)) for the case of a GBM. Although both simulations utilise identical parameters with a drift rate of a ¼ 0 per cent and a volatility of s ¼ 20 per cent, the sample paths look completely different. According to Leahy, both the competitive investor and the myopic planner find identical optimal trigger prices representing the competitive equilibrium. The reason is that the myopic planner commits two errors which completely offset each other (cf. Leahy, 1993) . First, he ignores the truncation of the price process and, therefore, overestimates the investment's profitability. Second, he wrongly assumes to have an exclusive option to postpone the investment. In this respect, the value of waiting makes it less attractive to invest immediately. In other words, the myopic planner is right for the wrong reasons. The implication of Leahy's result is that the burdensome and iterative determination of an endogenous equilibrium price process can be avoided when dealing with competitive markets. The complicated optimisation problem of a competitive investor can be replaced by the simpler problem of a myopic planner without a loss of precision. Using the McDonaldSiegel pricing formula, the optimal trigger price P of a myopic planner can be determined analytically (cf. McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 201) :
where r denotes the time-continuous discount rate and I the investment outlay for one additional output unit. Variable costs are not explicitly considered. Nevertheless, the restrictive and unrealistic preconditions of using the optimality principle of myopic planning considerably complicate its applicability to competitive markets. Accordingly, apart from the aforementioned assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, additional conditions are infinitely divisible investment projects and continuity of demand. Furthermore, the McDonald-Siegel pricing formula can be applied for an analytical solution only if the uncertain variable strictly follows a GBM (cf. McDonald and Siegel, 1986) . This is not the case, for example, in the presence of politically induced price floors. If these conditions are not met, a direct determination of the equilibrium in competitive markets would be necessary, which is commonly assessed in the literature as not practicable (cf. e.g. Leahy, 1993) .
In the next section, a real options market model will be developed allowing the direct determination of exactly this equilibrium in competitive markets. Therefore, it does not rely on the preconditions of applying the optimality principle of myopic planning and can be used more flexible than other models, e.g. by allowing for different political schemes.
The real options market model
For the purpose of studying policy interventions in a market for which the competing firms have to consider the ROA, a numerical model is developed in Section 3.1. This model identifies equilibrium strategies of the competing firms by combining stochastic simulations with the heuristic optimisation technique GA, which is illustrated in Section 3.2. Finally, Section 3.3 shows how the welfare effects of political schemes are quantified.
Description of the model
Consider a number of N homogenous and risk-neutral competing firms, each having repeatedly the opportunity to undertake an investment up to an exogenously given maximum production capacity X cap either now or at a later point within the period under consideration is T. The asset of investment is divisible and, thus, a step-by-step investment is possible as well. Size, investment outlay and production are proportional, i.e. there are no economies of scale. The production capacity of a firm n in t, resulting in a production output X n t , can be adjusted via investments just once in a period, resulting in an additional production output DX n t+Dt in the following period. If it is assumed that the investment costs are sunk in total, there are no possibilities to disinvest, i.e. the investment is perfectly irreversible. If the investment project has an unlimited useful lifetime, invested firms need to continue production, regardless of market conditions. However, in every period the production output declines corresponding to a geometric depreciation rate l. Then production follows:
The stochastic demand process m t and the price elasticity h are assumed to be known. Prices result from the reactions of all market participants on the exogenous stochastic demand process and, hence, need to be determined endogenously within the model. Without loss of generality, the relationship between market supply X t and price P t is defined by an isoelastic demand function according to equation (1). For modelling the demand parameter m t , any stochastic process can be applied flexibly as needed. However, to validate the results of the numerical model by replicating the optimality principle of myopic planning, m t is assumed to follow a GBM. Since the GBM, according to equation (2), assumes infinitesimal time step lengths and hence is impractical for simulation purposes, it is transformed into a time-discrete version. This can be done by the use of Ito's lemma (cf. Hull and White, 1987) :
with a standard normally distributed random number 1 t and a time step length Dt. Equation (7) represents an exact approximation of the time-continuous GBM for any Dt.
Within the model, perfect competition is assumed. Accordingly, the firms are assumed to have rational expectations and complete information regarding the development of demand and the investment behaviour of all competitors. Because of this, it should be expected that in equilibrium all firms have the same trigger price. However, in order to derive this Nash equilibrium by means of the GA approach described in the next subsection, the competing firms need to interact, which they do by defining their (at first different) trigger prices. This interaction of the firms equals a second-price sealed-bid auction in which each firm can sell its product (or enter the market) if it asks less than or equal to the market price. To derive the investment of the firms, it is assumed that firms with lower trigger prices have a stronger tendency to invest. Thus, all firms can be sorted according to their trigger prices, starting with the lowest, i.e. P n ≤ P n+1 . Consequently, firm n + 1 does not invest if firm n is not already completely invested. Likewise, it is obvious that if firm n is fully invested, firm n − 1 will fully invest. Moreover, in every period t, a marginal (or last) firm exists which invests to the extent that its trigger price equals the expected product price of the next period. For the size of investment of a firm n in t, that leads to an additional production output in t + Dt, the following definition applies:
Equation (8) implies the following:
1. The 'max-query' ensures the irreversibility of investments. Therefore, no disinvestments are possible in the case of a fall in demand ( DX˜n t+Dt ≥ 0). 2. The 'min-query' ensures that a firmñ cannot build up more production capacity via investments than it needs to produce its maximum production capacity X cap . 3. The 'min-query' also ensures that the total quantity of supply is just expanded as far as the trigger price of the 'last' invested firm equals the expected product price of the next period.
The goal of the model is to identify the optimal trigger prices of the firms, which can be expected to be (nearly) identical in equilibrium according to the above assumptions. For this, an objective function needs to be established that determines the investment behaviour of the agents in the model. Each firm's investment decisions aim to maximise the expected NPV of the future cash flows F n 0 , in the real options terminology also called option value, by choosing its firm-specific trigger price P n :
where k denotes the total costs of investment per output unit and period, which are composed of the capital cost of the initial investment outlay I and all other relevant costs c (e.g. material costs, labour costs):
In the following, the three political schemes are implemented into the model. In the case of a price floor P min maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply, the determination of the producer's price has to be modified. Considering the product price P t according to equation (1), the following applies to the effective producer's price P ′ t :
Consequently, P t in equation (9) is replaced by P ′ t . As a reference point, P min will be exogenously fixed as a proportion of the total costs of investment k. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) on the effects of price controls, it is assumed that governmental purchases are excluded from the market with no future impact on supply and demand. An investment subsidy s will be paid by the state to any firm undertaking investments in the respective industry. Accordingly, it reduces the initial investment outlay I by a fixed proportion. Thus, k in equation (9) is replaced by the effective producer's total costs of investment k
Finally, for the implementation of a politically induced production ceiling X max , the formula for the investment size of a firmñ according to equation (8) needs to be supplemented by a further 'min-query':
As explained in Section 2, the analytical derivation of the optimal trigger prices is not possible because political schemes are considered and the use of any stochastic demand processes (except a GBM) shall be feasible. To identify the individual optimal trigger prices and respectively the equilibrium trigger price despite these new features, the stochastic model is repeatedly simulated and linked to a GA. This combined solution procedure is described in the following subsection.
Solving the model by means of GAs and stochastic simulation
GAs are a heuristic search method for the optimisation or identification of equilibria in strategic settings, which have been used in many disciplines during the last two decades, including agriculture in particular (cf. e.g. Mayer, Belward and Burrage, 1996; Cacho and Simmons, 1999; Graubner, Balmann and Sexton, 2011) . GAs apply the evolutionary concepts of natural selection, crossover and mutation on a population of behavioural strategies (cf. e.g. Goldberg, 1989) . In this analysis, the GA is used to analyse the effects of specific policies on long-term equilibrium strategies of the firms (cf. e.g. Arifovic, 1994; Dawid, 1999) . The firms' equilibrium strategies are represented by the equilibrium investment trigger price. Even though GAs vary from each other in some detail, at least three attributes are considered as standard: a population of genomes, a fitness function and GA operators. A population of genomes generally describes a collection of candidate solutions to a given problem. In this case, each genome of a population represents the trigger price of a firm n. The population size chosen here is N ¼ 50, which at the same time corresponds to the number of firms. The fitness function generally serves as the evaluation criterion for the quality of a solution. Here, the fitness function is represented by the objective function of the model, that is, the option value of a firm n subject to its trigger price according to equation (9). Finally, the GA operators are applied to the population of genomes. Usually, and also in this case, the GA operators consist of selection, mutation and crossover. Through this procedure, good solutions are identified and new, possibly superior solutions are incorporated. The result is a new generation of the population of genomes on which the GA operators are repeatedly applied until no better solution can be found, that is, until the optimal trigger prices and, with this, the equilibrium trigger price are determined.
In the following, the steps of the GA are explained in detail and it is shown how the GA is combined with stochastic simulation. Programming of the GA can directly be done in MS EXCEL.
Step 1: Initialisation
The first generation of genomes is initialised by drawing random values for the trigger prices out of a pragmatically defined range, which results in N ¼ 50 heterogeneous trigger prices of the firms. This heterogeneity of genomes is a requirement for an efficient optimisation procedure of the GA (Mitchell, 1996) . Different to many other applications of GAs, the genomes are merely used as the floating point numbers of the trigger prices instead of being encoded into binary strings. The reasoning behind this that the model just aims to identify a single variable in a convex optimisation space, the equilibrium trigger price.
Step 2: Stochastic simulation of the option values of the firms
The stochastic demand parameter m t according to equation (7) is simulated over the period under consideration of T ¼ 100 years in S ¼ 50,000 simulation runs. For each simulation run, the demand parameter m t is used to calculate in any period the investments subject to the firms' trigger prices according to equation (8) and the already given production capacity. For this, following the model assumptions in the previous section, the firms are sorted according to the trigger price level starting with the lowest. The firm with the lowest trigger price invests to the extent of its maximum output capacity, followed by the firm with the second lowest trigger price, etc., until a last firm invests whose trigger price is equal to the expected price of the next period. The model ensures that there is always one last firm out of the N ¼ 50 firms that invests last. The investment size of a firm n yields the total production output corresponding to equation (6) with a maximum output capacity of X cap = 10. Subsequently, the product price following the demand function defined by equation (1) is calculated. Finally, the option value per firm according to equation (9) is calculated for the respective simulation run. The determination of the option value per firm is carried out as arithmetic mean of the option values of the repeated simulation runs with a given population of trigger prices and random demand parameters.
Step 3: Determination of the fitness of the investment strategies
The option values determined in step 2 provide information about the 'quality' of the respective genomes to solve the problem at hand: the higher the option value of a trigger price, the higher the fitness of the genome. Thus, the trigger prices are sorted according to their respective option values starting with the highest.
Step 4: Application of the GA operators On the basis of the genomes (i.e. the set of trigger prices) of the current generation and their fitness, the operators of the GA are applied to define the population of genomes of the next generation. It should be noted that the following specification represents only one of many possibilities. However, if selected and applied properly, the expected outcome is identical; only differences in the computational efficiency may occur. The functionality of the GA operators is illustrated in Figure 2 in a simplified form and explained in more detail in the subsequent steps 4.1 to 4.3.
Step 4.1: Selection and replication. Selection identifies the genomes (i.e. the set of trigger prices) to be reproduced in the next generation. The common feature is selection proportional to the fitness value of the genome. The higher the fitness of a genome, the more likely it is to be selected for replication. Here the five most successful strategies are quadrupled, the next five are tripled, the next five are doubled and the next five survive but are not multiplied. Hence, the other 30 genomes of the current generation are not selected for the next generation, i.e. deleted.
By duplicating the fittest strategies, it is ensured that the population converges towards the equilibrium trigger price throughout the optimisation process. By this, however, the variability of the population decreases. Moreover, the initial population consists of random values for the trigger prices whereby it is unlikely that a good or even close to optimal solution is contained. In order to extend the search space during the process and to avoid the lock-in of the process in a suboptimal state, new strategies are to be generated. This happens in the next two steps: crossover and mutation.
Step 4.2: Crossover. Crossover recombines the information of two parent genomes to create one or two offspring with a given probability, the crossover rate. In this case, for every trigger price from Selection and Replication starting with the ninth fittest, the arithmetic mean from itself and its foregoing neighbour is calculated to produce an offspring with a crossover rate of 5 per cent. By leaving the first eight trigger prices unchanged, it is ensured that potential optimal solutions of the current population do not get lost and that the GA arrives at a stable result.
Step 4.3: Mutation. Mutation is a random manipulation of a solution with a given probability, the mutation rate, and thus also creates new genetic varieties. Furthermore, it serves as a reminder or insurance operator against an early fixation on an inferior solution as it allows to recover lost genetic material from previous generations. Here, every trigger price from Crossover starting with the ninth fittest is modified with a mutation rate of 20 per cent. Specifically, the trigger price is changed by a factor which is determined by drawing a random number out of the range from 22 to 2 per cent. Step 5: Next generation
Step 4 results in a new population of trigger prices, on which the steps 2 and 3 are applied again. This process is repeated until the population of trigger prices converges towards an equilibrium, and the equilibrium trigger price of the firms is hence determined. Accordingly, the GA can be stopped when the obtained strategies are both homogenous, i.e. very similar to each other within one generation, and stable, i.e. very similar from one generation to the next. In this case, both stop criteria are achieved if the arithmetic mean of the trigger prices of the 10 fittest firms has not changed up to the fourth decimal place for at least 100 generations.
It should be noted that, due to the nature of the GA, there still exists a low risk of a suboptimal solution. To solve this issue, the GA is run for a specific scenario more than once. Only if the resulting equilibrium trigger price is very similar to each other over several GA runs, i.e. merely differs from the fourth decimal place, is the global optimum found.
Quantifying the welfare effects of political schemes
To quantify the welfare effects of different political schemes, the concept of consumer and producer surplus is applied (cf. e.g. Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 2004: ch. 8) . Accordingly, Figure 3 shows the welfare without (left half) and with (right half) political schemes, using the example of price floors maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply. In the figure, a comparative-static view for a random production period is taken for the sake of illustration. As a consequence, the supply function is fully price-inelastic. The welfare is composed of three components (cf. Figure 3) : the consumer surplus CS, the producer surplus PS and the state budget BG. The latter must be paid for by taxes, and hence it is ultimately a cost to consumers. Analytically, the consumer surplus corresponds to the integral below the demand function up to the quantity demanded, less the expenditures. As the demand function according to equation (1) tends to infinity for X 0 and a negative elasticity of demand, the willingness to pay would also be infinite. To avoid this, the minimum quantity demanded is assumed to be 1. Thus, the results for the below efficiency measures can only be interpreted as ordinal numbers. The three welfare components for the base scenario of the absence of political schemes, for price floors maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply, for investment subsidies and for production ceilings, are determined according to Table 1 .
The total welfare for the whole period under consideration is calculated as the present value of the welfare of all T production periods (cf. e.g. Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 2004: ch. 14) :
For the determination of the effects of policy interventions on the economic efficiency, the welfare with the respective political scheme, WF with , is finally set in relationship to the welfare without political schemes, WF without , resulting in the economic efficiency measure R:
In order to correctly consider the volume dynamics when determining R, it is essential to use two different sets of genomes: the optimal trigger prices in case of the existence of a political scheme are taken for the calculation of WF with and the optimal trigger prices in case of the absence of a political scheme are taken for the calculation of WF without . In the course of the stochastic simulation, R is calculated S times and, consequently, the expected economic efficiency results from the arithmetic mean of R over all simulation runs S.
Results
The discussion of the results of the model is split into three parts. In Section 4.1, the numerical model results are validated by replicating the optimality principle of myopic planning for the base scenario of no political scheme. Subsequently, the effects of political schemes on trigger prices, firm profitabilities and economic efficiencies under general conditions are analysed by using the example of price floors maintained by governmental purchases of excess 
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Validation of the model
For validating the numerical model results, a drift rate of a = 0 per cent, a volatility of s = 20 per cent, a price elasticity of h = −1 and a depreciation rate of l = 0 per cent are chosen. The risk-free time-continuous interest rate is fixed at r = 5.83 per cent (which corresponds to a time-discrete interest rate of 6 per cent p.a.). The total costs of investment per output unit are standardised at k = 1 and, without loss of generality, are assumed to merely consist of the capital costs of investment, that is, c = 0. Accordingly, the initial investment outlay is I= 16.67 following equation (10). Using the McDonald-Siegel pricing formula (cf. equation (5)), the resulting trigger price is P = 1.7818. In the numerical model, however, the respective trigger price is P = 1.5819 with Dt = 1. The reason for this underestimation lies in the discretisation of time, which is an unavoidable assumption of numerical evaluation methods in contrast to (time-continuous) analytical procedures. This time-discrete procedure, at the same time, represents an advantage of numerical models with regard to their application, especially in agriculture as investments often can be made just once a year because of a long implementation time, climate restrictions, etc. Nevertheless, the analytical result can be approximated through increasingly smaller time step lengths as illustrated in Table 2 . The trigger price increases with smaller time step lengths because the associated smaller time lag in production reduces the likelihood of a (strong) overshooting in prices of the upper reflecting barrier. As a result, the expected product price is, ceteris paribus, lower and hence induces a higher trigger price to compensate the investment costs.
Effects of price floors on trigger prices, option values and economic efficiencies
In the following, the effects of the implementation respectively the abolishment of price floors on trigger prices, options values and economic efficiencies are analysed under general conditions. The option values are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the option values of all firms according to equation (9). The economic efficiencies are calculated according to equation (15). Furthermore, the impacts of varying drift rates, volatilities, price elasticities and depreciation rates on the effectiveness of price floors are investigated. The price floors are fixed at P min = 80, 90, 95 and 97.5 per cent of the total costs of investment, which are again standardised at k = 1 for all firms. The risk-free interest rate is r = 5.83 per cent. In Table 3 , the optimal trigger prices, average option values and economic efficiencies are quoted for different drift rates (a = −2.5, 0, −2.5 per cent) and different volatilities (s = 10, 20, 40 per cent). The price elasticity is fixed at h = −1, and for the depreciation rate, l = 0 per cent is chosen. The results presented in Table 3 can be summarised as follows:
1. The implementation and the increase of a price floor, respectively, induces a decline in trigger prices. This is due to the fact that the price floor represents a lower reflecting barrier for the firms, whereby the expected future price rises. Consequently, a lower trigger price can already ensure a compensation of the investment costs by the expected present value of the future cash flows. 2. The option values amount to (nearly) zero for all scenarios, which can also be confirmed by a simple comparison of means at a 5 per cent significance level. This means that the firms do not make any profits despite a price floor, that is, the zero-profit condition is still met. To the extent that the expected future price increases through the implementation of the price floor (cf. 1.), the firms cause a decline of the upper reflecting barrier by investing earlier. Therefore, though price stabilisation policies induce less risk for the producers, they do not offer any sustainable financial benefits. 3. The economic efficiency decreases with the implementation of a price floor. By static view, this follows directly from Figure 3 . In addition, the higher the price floor, the stronger the reduction in economic efficiency. The reason is that the government needs to intervene more often through purchases of excess supply. 4. The trigger price can even fall below the total costs of investment k = 1. This is especially obvious for a = 0 per cent, s = 40 per cent and P min = 97.5 per cent, where the trigger price is merely P = 0.9014. This is because of the discrete time assumed in the model, which causes a time lag in production. Through this, it becomes more likely that prices (strongly) overshoot the upper reflecting barrier in the short term, even in case of a very fine discretisation of time, while they can never fall below the price floor. In other words, the firms invest at a trigger price below the total costs of investment, because they hope for sporadic upward 'outliers'. 5. A positive drift rate induces decreasing trigger prices as expected because product prices recover relatively quickly after negative demand shocks. What is remarkable is that the economic inefficiency of a price floor is less pronounced. The reason is that with a higher drift rate the price floor, ceteris paribus, is hit less often. Therefore, the government needs to intervene less frequently, even though the upper reflecting barrier is lower and thus the market price level is lower as well. 6. A classical statement of option pricing theory is that the investment threshold increases with a higher risk of the future cash flows (cf. Section 2). In contrast, the results of the model show that if the price floor is sufficiently high, a higher volatility can, ceteris paribus, even lead to lower trigger prices. This is the case, e.g. for a = 0 per cent and P min = 97.5 per cent. At s = 20 per cent, the trigger price amounts to P = 0.9939, while at s = 40 per cent, it amounts to P = 0.9014. The effect can be explained by a higher fluctuation margin of prices: a (strong) overshooting of the upper reflecting barrier becomes more likely while prices are buffered downwards at the same time by means of the higher price floor. As a result, the expected product price is higher and, hence, allows for a lower trigger price. 7. The higher the volatility, the stronger the reduction in trigger prices and economic efficiencies by increasing the price floor (cf. 1. and 3.). The trigger price is lower because an overshooting of the upper reflecting barrier becomes more likely in combination with a downward buffering at the same time. The economic efficiency is lower, as with a higher volatility, the price floor, ceteris paribus, is being hit more often and stronger. Consequently, the implementation, respectively the increase of a price floor, leads to a stronger externalisation of entrepreneurial risks and losses, the more volatile the respective market is.
To assess the impact of different price elasticities on the effectiveness of political schemes, in Table 4 the trigger prices, option values and economic efficiencies at different price floors are quoted for price elasticities of demand with h = −0.5, −1 and −2. The drift rate is fixed at a = 0 per cent, the volatility at s = 20 per cent and the depreciation rate at l = 0 per cent. The results in Table 4 reveal that, in the absence of a price floor, the trigger price decreases with a higher absolute value of the price elasticity. This can be illustrated by looking at the effects of any (positive or negative) demand shock on the price dynamics: If the elasticity is h = −1, the relative logarithmic change of the product price, ceteris paribus, corresponds to the one of the demand shock below the upper reflecting barrier. However, with an elasticity of h = −0.5 (−2), the absolute value of the relative logarithmic change of the product price is higher (lower) than the one of the demand shock. Therefore, the price volatility increases with a lower total value of the elasticity, and with this the trigger price increases as well. This effect, however, weakens with the implementation of a price floor and can even move into reverse if the price floor is sufficiently high. This is the case, e.g. for P min = 95 per cent. At h = −1, the trigger price amounts to P = 1.0841,while at h = −0.5 it is considerably lower at P = 0.9572. The reason is that the trigger price decreasing effect of the price floor overcompensates the trigger price increasing effect of the lower total value of the elasticity at a certain level. Furthermore, the reduction of the economic efficiency through a price floor is less strong, the higher the absolute value of the elasticity. This is due to the fact that the price floor is hit less often and less strong with the associated lower volatility of the price process. Finally, the impact of varying depreciation rates on the effectiveness of political schemes is investigated as well. Table 5 quotes the trigger prices, option values and economic efficiencies at different price floors for depreciation rates of l = 0, 5 and 10 per cent. The drift rate is a = 0 per cent, the volatility s = 20 per cent and the price elasticity h = −1.
The results of Table 5 show that increasing depreciation rates, ceteris paribus, induce lower trigger prices and, furthermore, lower reductions in economic efficiencies. Both effects can be explained with the transformation rule for the drift rate below equation (3). Accordingly, a higher depreciation rate has an increasing effect on the drift rate of the price process, which again causes lower trigger prices because the expected product price rises. For this reason, the reduction in the economic efficiency is lower as well because the price floor is hit less often.
Comparison of the effects of price floors, investment subsidies and production ceilings
By additionally implementing investment subsidies and production ceilings at different levels into the model, the same general effects as in the case of price floors can be observed (cf. Section 4.2). It is yet to clarify how the three political schemes differ from each other concerning their welfare effects for a given reduction of the trigger price. For this purpose, in Table 6 the effects of price floors, investment subsidies and production ceilings on the trigger prices and the economic efficiencies are compared for a drift rate of a = 0 per cent, a volatility of s = 20 per cent, a price elasticity of h = −1 and a depreciation rate of l = 0 per cent. By iterative searching, the investment subsidies and the production ceilings are fixed such that the resulting trigger prices (nearly) equal the trigger prices of the price floors at P min = 80 and 95 per cent.
According to the results of Table 6 , the economic efficiencies of both an investment subsidy and a production ceiling are nearly the same at both trigger price levels. Furthermore, the economic efficiency of a price floor is significantly lower. This can be explained by looking at the three welfare components separately:
1. The consumer surplus in case of an investment subsidy is considerably higher than in case of a price floor. This can be illustrated by the following: as the trigger prices for both political schemes are the same, the market supply of the firms is the same as well. Therefore, the consumer surplus resulting from an investment subsidy is higher to the extent of the areas g and h on the right side of Figure 3 , compared with the consumer surplus resulting from a price floor. The consumer surplus in case of a production ceiling again is slightly lower than in case of a price floor. The reason is that limiting the market supply through a production ceiling in periods of high demand obviously reduces the consumer surplus stronger than maintaining the price floor through governmental purchases of excess supply in periods of low demand. 2. The producer surplus amounts to (nearly) zero for all three political schemes, which can also be confirmed by a simple comparison of means at a 5 per cent significance level. This follows directly from the aforementioned validity of the zero-profit condition, that is, in equilibrium the competing firms do not make any profit despite political support. 3. The burden of the state budget is zero in case of a production ceiling (cf. Table 1 ) and positive to nearly the same extent for both a price floor and an investment subsidy. The latter is due to the fact that both measures reduce the trigger price to the same level by paying the farmers a financial compensation for investing correspondingly earlier. As the stochastic demand process is the same in both cases, this compensation has to be the same as well. 4. The economic efficiency of an investment subsidy is higher than the economic efficiency of a price floor. As the producer surplus and the state budget are the same for both measures (cf. 2. and 3.), this follows directly from the higher consumer surplus in case of an investment subsidy (cf. 1.). Furthermore, the economic efficiencies of both an investment subsidy and a production ceiling are nearly at the same level. Although the consumer surplus of an investment subsidy is significantly higher (cf. 1.), this is obviously fully compensated by the negative welfare effect through burdening the state budget, which again is zero for a production ceiling (cf. 3.). Under the given stimulation of the willingness to invest, investment subsidies and production ceilings, therefore, are more advantageous than price floors.
Concluding remarks
The policy impact analysis in competitive markets in which real options exist is challenging. Investment thresholds in such markets can be determined analytically only under very restrictive assumptions. This in particular refers to the absence of political schemes, which affect the price dynamics directly, such as price floors, or indirectly, such as production ceilings. A wide range of relevant policy shifts and interventions, therefore, cannot be analysed in a straightforward analytical way. The objective of this paper was hence to develop the conceptual basis of assessing numerically the effects of different political schemes in competitive markets with real options effects. This was achieved by developing and validating a real options market model and linking it to a combination of GAs and stochastic simulation. Through this, the unrealistic preconditions for deriving a solution in an analytical way can be relaxed and a vast modelling flexibility is gained. The model can handle different political schemes including those for which a closed form solution is not possible, e.g. price supports or quota systems. Moreover, non-standard stochastic demand processes can be used and hence the model can be matched to specific (agricultural) markets as needed.
The results of this analysis underline the relevance of the model with regard to the assessment of current and (potential) future policy changes in agriculture. Accordingly, it is shown that the implementation or the extension of political schemes, e.g. the implementation of guaranteed feed-in prices for renewable energies within the German EEG, generally increases the willingness to invest but can cause a significant reduction of the welfare. At the same time, these effects also apply in the opposite direction, that is, the abolishment or the lowering of such measures, e.g. the abolishment of the quota systems for milk and sugar beets in the EU. Moreover, it is proved that under consideration of political schemes, the zero-profit condition is still met in competitive markets underlying real options effects, i.e. the producers mutually 'marginalise' the additional financial assistance they receive from the government in the long run. This is particularly worth mentioning, as 'helping the producers' is the most commonly used argument by farmers and lobbyists when calling for additional political support, e.g. in the dairy sector in recent years. With regard to the comparison of different policies, the results suggest that under the given assumptions, both investment subsidies and production ceilings are preferable to price floors because the welfare is reduced less.
However, it should be noted that the results of the present study are still based on some simplifying assumptions: while the use of a GBM for the stochastic demand process allows the validation of the model in the first instance, its application to specific markets, e.g. the dairy sector, would need further adjustments. In this context, further sensitivity analyses would be necessary before applying the model empirically. Furthermore, the assumption of homogenous agents represents a simplification from reality. It should also be noted that by means of the model good but not necessarily the best policies are determined for the respective market because these need to be exogenously given. This basket of political schemes selected ex ante by policy makers could potentially exclude the most superior one.
